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The major problem of the current system is the lack of
established guidelines or standards for judges to use when deter-
mining the sentence. In addition to needed guidelines, review
of sentencing procedures is also necessary to insure that estab-
lished guidelines are followed. Due to the Louisiana supreme
court's stated inability to review sentences without express
statutory power,49 needed reform must necessarily proceed from
an informed legislature that is ready to extend judicial review
to this important aspect of the criminal process. Until such
legislative reform, internal court action in the form of seminars
for judges wherein a free exchange of ideas regarding sen-
tencing could be extremely helpful in alleviating some problems.
Also, the judicial administrator could compile and distribute
sentencing data to members of the judiciary, to be used in
formulating sentencing guidelines. Even with such information
appellate review of sentences is still essential if the defendant
is to have a forum in which to seek redress when the judicial
guidelines are disregarded. Without review, the objectives set
forth by the ABA in drafting the standards relating to appellate
review of sentences would in large measure, be defeated.
Julian Glenn Dupree
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL
GUARANTEE IN LOUISIANA
The right to a speedy trial, recognized from the time of the
Magna Charta1 is secured by the Constitutions of the United
States2 and Louisiana,s and by the Louisiana Code of Criminal
sentencing problem is for the legislature to revise some of the current
penalties which are provided for the various crimes. See, e.g., Ruben, Dis-
parity & Equality of Sentsnces-A Constitutional Challenge, 40 F.R.D. 55, 56
(1966); Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, & the Model Penal Code, 109 U.
PA. L. REv. 465, 472-75 (1961).
49. State v. Polk, 258 La. 738, 247 So.2d 853 (1971).
1. "To none will we sell, to none deny or delay right of justice." 4 W.
BILACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *422.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial."
3. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to a speedy public trial by an Impartial jury .... "
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Procedure.4 A primary reason for the guarantee is that delay
often prejudices the defendant's ability to present a defense, due
to the disappearance of evidence and witnesses, fading memories
and a loss of perspective of past events. Preventing undue and
oppressive incarceration and minimizing the anxiety accompany-
ing public accusation are also generally recognized as factors
in protecting a defendant's right to a speedy trial.5 There are
societal interests as well: a speedy trial facilitates effective' pros-
ecution and maximizes the effect of the criminal law.8 In addi-
tion, the public must bear the costs of maintaining prisoners in
jail (and often support for families of incarcerated breadwin-
ners). When the accused is freed on bail or reconizance, the
public interest in speedy trial lies in minimizing opportunities
to flee or engage in criminal activity.
Although the United States Supreme Court has never applied
the speedy trial guarantee to delays before arrest or indictment,
it has been argued that the scope of the right should include
such delays, since prejudice to the defendant's ability to prepare
a defense can occur during this period.7 However, most courts
have been reluctant to agree, reasoning that the speedy trial
guarantee is applicable only to an "accused," that statutes of
limitation control this delay,9 or that its application to delays
in institution of prosecution would unduly handicap police efforts
to apprehend criminals.' This Comment will examine only post-
arrest delays under the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
in light of considerations underlying the constitutional right
to a speedy trial.
Constitutional Limitations
The sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is "necessarily
4. LA. CODM CrIM. P. art. 701: "The state and the defendant have the
right to a speedy trial." Articles 571-83 deal with the specific time limita-
tions upon institution of prosecution and limitations upon bringing the
accused to trial. See notes 43-47 and accompanying text infra.
5. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
6. See J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY or LEGISLATION 326 (Ogden ed. 1931):
"It is desirable that punishment should follow offense as closely as possible;
for its impression on the minds of men is weakened by distance."
7. See Note, 20 STAN. L. Rev. 476, 489 (1968).
8. See, e.g., People v. Jordan, 45 Cal. 2d 697, 708, 290 P.2d 484, 491 (1955);
State v. Vawter, 236 Ore. 85, 91, 386 P.2d 915, 918 (1963).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Ponczko, 3867 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1966); Bruce
v. United States, 351 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1965).
10. See, e.g., Halcomb v. Eckel, 110 Ohio App. 208, 165 N.E.2d 479 (1959).
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relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circum-
stances."'1 Although "the delay must not be purposeful or
oppressive,"'1 2 "the essential ingredient is orderly expedition and
not mere speed."'13 In Klopfer v. North Carolina,1 4 the right was
deemed "as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the
Sixth Amendment,' 5 and, accordingly, was made applicable to
state prosecutions by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.'6 The United States Supreme Court has recognized
as basic three demands of criminal justice underlying the speedy
trial guarantee: preventing undue and oppressive incarceration
prior to trial; minimizing anxiety and concern accompanying
public accusation; and limiting the possibilities that long delay
will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself. 7
The recent decision in Barker v. Wingoa' set out for the first
time the criteria by which the right to a speedy trial is to be
judged. The opinion identified four factors courts should assess
when faced with speedy-trial claims: length of the delay, reason
for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prej-
udice to the defendant. 9
The length of the delay must be examined first, because
without a delay which is "presumptively prejudicial" there is
no need to. inquire into the other factors.20 However, the decision
in Barker does not attempt to specify such a period, regarding
the length of delay that will provoke inquiry as "necessarily
dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case."'2'
The second factor, the reason for the delay, also carries
variable weight. Deliberate attempts to hamper the defense
should be weighed heavily against the government; a more
neutral reason (e.g., overcrowded courts) should be weighed less
11. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905).
12. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957).
13. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966), quoting from Smith v.
United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10 (1959).
14. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
15. Id. at 223.
16. Id. at 226. See also Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970); and Smith
v. Hooey, 398 U.S. 374 (1969).
17. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S.
116, (1966).
18. 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972).
19. The Court discussed issues which had been raised by Justice Brennan
in his concurring opinion In Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 39 (1970).




heavily, but ultimate responsibility must rest with the govern-
ment rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason,
such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate
delay.22
Two approaches have been used in the past with regard to
the third factor, i.e., whether a defendant must have previously
demanded a trial in order to assert denial of the speedy trial
guarantee. The first approach is the establishment of a time
period within which a defendant must either be brought to trial
or the charge dismissed; this type of rule is usually promulgated
legislatively,28 although courts have also imposed it. 2 4 A second
approach would require the defendant to make a demand in
order to later assert denial of his right to a speedy trial.25 The
"demand rule" has been construed within the concept of waiver:
a defendant is deemed to have waived his right to a speedy
trial for the period prior to making a demand. 26 The Court
in Barker rejected a mechanical application of either: the
specified time limit approach because there is "no constitu-
tional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be
quantified into a specified number of days or months,"' and
the demand waiver rule because it is inconsistent with prior
22. Id., citing as an example United States v. Butler, 426 F.2d 1275 (1st
Cir. 1970) where the court thought a delay of nine months overly long,
absent a good reason, in a case that depended on eyewitness testimony.
At least one writer has criticized Barker in its treatment of the temporal
factor and feels the Court's determination of the length of the delay as a
"triggering mechanism" may be read to preclude further consideration of
length of delay after inquiry is triggered. See Uviller, Barker v. Wingo:
Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 COLUm. L. REv. 1376, 1385 (1972).
23. See, e.g., LA. CODE C0iM. P. arts. 578-83.
24. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
established that in the district courts in the Second Circuit, except in unusual
circumstances, the charge will be dismissed unless the government is ready
for trial within six months of arrest.
25. The approaches are not always mutually exclusive. In State v. Dupree,
256 La. 146, 235 So.2d 408 (1970), the court found an interruption of the
period of limitations by the defendant's escape. The court refused to rule
that the interruption terminated when the defendant was captured and
incarcerated in another jurisdiction, based upon the theory that the defen-
dant made no demand to be tried on the outstanding Louisiana charge.
26. A similar approach was taken in the court of appeals in Barker v.
Wingo, 442 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir. 1971). See also Barker v. Wingo, 92 S. Ct.
2182, 2189 nn. 22-23.
27. 92 S. Ct. at 2188. "The states, of course, are free to prescribe a rea-
sonable period consistent with constitutional standards, but our approach
must be less precise." Id.
1973]
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decisions dealing with waiver of constitutional rights.2 Waiver
is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege,"29 and the court has strongly disapproved
presumption of acquiescense from a silent record.30 The decision
in Barker does not disregard demand; assertion or failure to
assert is to be considered, but is only one factor in the balancing
test.3 ' Affirming language in Dickey v. Florida,2 Barker places
the primary burden on the courts and prosecutors to assure that
cases are brought to trial.8
The fourth factor in the balancing test is the prejudice the
defendant suffered due to the delay. The opinion in Barker
directs that prejudice be examined in light of the interests the
right to a speedy trial was designed to protect: preventing
oppressive pre-trial incarceration, minimizing anxiety and limit-
ing the possibility that the defense will be impaired.3 4 The Court
notes that pre-trial incarceration often means loss of a job,
disruption of family life and enforced idleness. "The time spent
in jail is simply dead time . . . . Moreover, if a defendant is
locked up, he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence,
28. Id. at 2189-90, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1964); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S.
389 (1937); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 801 U.S. 292 (1937).
29. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
30. See cases cited at note 28 mp4ra.
31. 92 S. Ct. at 2191: "We think the better rule is that the defendant's
assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial is one of the
factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the right.
Such a formulation avoids the rigidities of the demand-waiver rule and the
resulting possible unfairness in its application. It allows the trial court to
exercise a judicial discretion based on the circumstances, including due
consideration of any applicable formal procedural rule. It would permit,
for example, a court to attach a different weight to a situation in which
the defendant knowingly fails to object from a situation in which his
attorney acquiesces in long delay without adequately informing his client
or from a situation in which no counsel is appointed. It would also allow
the court to weigh the frequency and force of the objections as opposed
to attaching significant weight to a purely pro forma objection."
32. 398 U.S. 30, 37-38 (1970): "Although a great many accused persons
try to put off the confrontation as long as possible, the right to a prompt
inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental and the duty of the charging
party is to provide a prompt trial."
33. 92 S. Ct. at 2192: "We hardly need add that if delay is attributable
to the defendant, then his waiver may be given effect under the standard
waiver doctrine, the demand rule aside."
34. Id. at 2193, citing Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969); Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); and United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S.
116 (1966). It is noteworthy that in Klopfer, the petitioner did not allege an
impairment of his ability to prepare a defense; the remand was based on
anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation.
[Vol. 33
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contact witnesses or otherwise prepare his defense."85 In Barker,
which the Court considered to be a "close" case, the prejudice
was minimal; no witnesses died or disappeared." Although the
delay at the behest of the prosecution was well over five years,
the Court found that Barker did not desire a speedy trial.s
The state first wanted to try an alleged accomplice, one Man-
ning, and Barker consented to the prosecution's numerous mo-
tions for continuance, not objecting until Manning was finally
(after two hung juries and two reversals) convicted. As to
Barker, the Court found
"[t]he probable reason for Barker's attitude was that he
was gambling on Manning's acquittal. The evidence was
not terribly strong against Manning as the reversals and
hung juries suggest, and Barker undoubtedly thought that
if Manning were acquitted, he would never be tried."-"
So although the court discouraged mechanical application of the
so-called "demand rule,"39 the decision in Barker is grounded
essentially on the defendant's failure to assert his right to a
speedy trial.
Implementation of the Guarantee in Louisiana Prosecutions
Although specific time limitations to encourage expeditious
handling of criminal cases are not constitutionally compelled,40
most states, including Louisiana, 41 have chosen to use the device.-
The American Bar Association has approved such a rule:
"A defendant's right to a speedy trial should be expressed
by rule or statute in terms of days or months running from
a specified event. Certain periods of necessary delay should
be excluded in comprising the time for trial, and these should
be specifically identified by rule of statute insofar as is prac-
ticable. '42
35. 92 St. Ct. at 2193.
36. One difficulty in looking to an apparent absence of prejudice is that
what has been forgotten cannot be shown from an examination of the
record.
37. Barker v. Wingo, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2194 (1972).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2194-95.
40. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
41. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 578-83.
42. A mucAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJE cT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JusTIcE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL § 2.1 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL.]
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Louisiana has two types of time limitations: one set of rules
covers the period between alleged commission of the offense
and the institution of prosecution; 43 the second set establishes
the time in which the state must bring a defendant to trial,
counting from the time of institution of prosecution." The Code
of Criminal Procedure articles which are particularly important
in determining allowable delays after institution of prosecution
are the following:
"Art. 578
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, no trial shall
be commenced:
(1) In capital cases after three years from the institu-
tion of prosecution;
(2) In other felony cases after two years from the date
of institution of the prosecution and;
(3) In misdemeanor cases one year from the date of
institution of prosecution.
The offense charged shall determine the applicable limita-
tion."
"Art. 579
The period of limitation established by Article 578 shall be
interrupted if:
(1) The defendant, at any time, with the purpose to
avoid detection, apprehension or prosecution, flees
from the state, is outside the state, or is absent
from his usual place of abode within the state, or
43. LA. CODE CRIm. P. arts. 571-77. Article 571 provides "t]here is no time
limitation upon the institution of prosecution for any crime for which the
death penalty may be Imposed." Although the Supreme Court has recently
ruled the death penalty unconstitutional in most circumstances, Furman v.
Georgia, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972), presumably those crimes which were formerly
regarded as capital remain so for procedural matters. Article 572 limits
institution of prosecution to six years for felonies necessarily punishable
by imprisonment at hard labor, four years for other felonies, two years
for misdemeanors where imprisonment is possible and six months for mis-
demeanors punishable only by a fine or forfeiture.
44. Bee LA. CODD CraM. P. arts. 578-83.
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(2) The defendant cannot be tried because of insanity
or because his presence cannot be obtained by legal
process, or for any other cause beyond the control
of the state.
The period of limitation established by Article 578 shall
commence to run anew from the date the cause of inter-
ruption no longer exists."
The code also provides for a suspension4 5 of the period for
the time required for ruling on the defendant's preliminary
motions providing that "in no case shall the state have less
than one year after the ruling to commence trial."" Similarly,
when there is a mistrial or an order for a new trial the state
has one year or the remainder of the original period, whichever
is longer, in which to bring the defendant to trial.4 7
One subject not covered specifically in the articles dealing
with time limitation is the effect of a motion for a continuance.
The American Bar Association Minimum Standards provide:
"The court should grant a continuance only upon a showing of
good cause and only for as long as necessary, taking into account
not only the request of the prosecution or defense, but also the
public interest in prompt disposition of the case."" Although
under Louisiana law a motion for a continuance must be tried
contradictorily,49 and is within the discretion of the court,0 there
is no authority in the trial judge to deny the motion where
both parties consent.5 The Code does not specifically provide
what effect a consensual continuance has upon the running of
the time limitations, but the Louisiana supreme court has ruled
that where the state consents to the defendant's motion for con-
tinuance, the time limitations continue to run.52 The reasoning
is that where the state does not oppose the motion, the reason
45. When "suspended," the time a defendant is held which had run prior
to the cause of suspension is included in computation; "interruption" starts
the period over. See id. art. 579, comment (a).
46. Id. art. 580.
47. Id. art. 582.
48. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL § 1.3.
49. LA. CoDS Cram. P. art. 711.
50. Id. art. 712.
51. Id. art. 713: "A continuance shall be granted when the state and
the defendant both request it, or as otherwise provided by law."
52. State v. Hudson, 263 La. 72, 267 So.2d 198 (1972); cf. State v. Benson,
254 La. 867, 227 So.2d 913 (1969).
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that the defendant cannot be tried is not one "beyond the
control of the state" as provided in article 579. Presumably, if
the state opposes the motion unsuccessfully, an interruption
would occur under article 579.
Some of the Louisiana jurisprudence reflects reliance on the
literal wording of the Code without regard to the interests those
provisions are designed to protect. In State v. Montgomery3 the
defendant was originally indicted and convicted in 1963, but his
conviction was reversed in 1966. After the new trial was ordered,
the defendant escaped from the parish jail and was at large
for two hours. In 1969, he was convicted again on the original
charge and appealed, pleading the running of the limitation on
bringing to trial. The supreme court, in affirming the conviction,
held that the period of limitation had been interrupted by the
two hour jailbreak, with the result that a new three year period
of limitation began running after the defendant's recapture. The
majority opinion relied on article 579, which provides for an
interruption if "(1) the defendant at any time, with the purpose
to avoid detection, apprehension or prosecution flees the state,
is outside the state, or is absent from his usual place of abode
within the state." The court concluded that "it matters not
how long the conduct specified in Article 579 (1) persists or
whether it has any effect on the progress of the trial. The simple
fact of its occurrence results in, at that time, an interruption.''54
Justice Barham, dissented, arguing that "[t]he determination of
the period of limitation for the retrial of this defendant was
established at the moment the order for a new trial became
final."55 Article 582 required that the defendant be brought to
trial "within one year from the date the new trial is granted...
or within the period established by Article 578, whichever is
longer." Since the escape occurred after the new trial was
granted, the dissent reasoned, it could only interrupt the one
year period which had attached. Therefore, a trial in 1969 was not
timely. The dissent did not reach the question of whether there
was an interruption of the time limitation by the escape. The
reasoning of the dissent was adopted by the Legislature in the
enactment of a new provision, article 583, during the 1972
53. 257 La. 461, 242 So.2d 818 (1970).
54. Id. at 466, 242 So.2d at 819.
55. Id. at 470, 242 So.2d at 821.
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session.56 The Montgomery decision however, still stands as
authority for the proposition that the mere occurrence of one
of the events listed in article 579 results in an interruption, with-
out regard to whether it delays the bringing to trial. When there
is no resulting delay, as the state conceded in Montgomery,57
an interruption seems merely punitive. Since escape is itself a
substantive offense under the Criminal Code,58 fear of affecting
an interruption is not likely to further deter an escape attempt.
Moreover, if the provisions dealing with time limitations are to
implement the right to a speedy trial, the writer submits that
an interruption should occur only if the situation does in fact
result in prevention or delay in bringing the defendant to trial.
Another problem area in the application of Louisiana pro-
cedural rules occurs when the defendant is incarcerated prior
to the return of an indictment or the filing of a bill of informa-
tion. The American Bar Association Minimum Standards rec-
ommend that the time for trial begin running from the date
the charge is filed, except where the defendant has been con-
tinuously held in custody or on bail or recognizance until formal
charging to answer for the same crime or a crime based on the
same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode. In that
situation, the time for trial should commence running from the
date the defendant was first held to answer. 9 In a recent case,
State v. Gladden, the Louisiana supreme court held that the
"date of institution of prosecution" referred to in article 579 is
the date of indictment or information, not the earlier date when
the defendant was arrested and incarcerated. In Gladden, the
defendant raised the issue of delay by means of both the running
of time limitations and the denial of the constitutional right to
a speedy trial. In ruling on the question of the time limitations,
the court held, without citing any authority, that the two year
period of limitation did not commence running until formal
charges had been filed several months after the defendant was
arrested. The writer submits that the interests which the speedy
56. LA. CODE CRM. P. art. 583 provides: "The period of limitation estab-
lished by Article 582 shall be interrupted by any of the causes stated in
Article 579. Where such interruption occurs, the state must commence
the new trial within one year from the date the cause of the interruption
no longer exists." Added by La. Acts 1972, No. 677 § 1.
57. 257 La. at 464, 242 So.2d at 819.
58. LA. R.S. 14:110 (Supp. 1972).
59. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL § 2.2.
60. 260 La. 735, 257 So.2d 388 (1972).
19731
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trial guarantee attempts to protect are affected by all post-arrest
delays. If the constitutional right to a speedy trial is designed
to protect the defendant from oppressive pre-trial incarceration,
and the time limitations are to implement that right, then the
period of limitation should commence running from the moment
of incarceration. The anxiety and concern accompanying public
accusation are presumably also felt when one has been arrested,
even though formal charges have not yet been filed. To an
accused in jail awaiting trial, witnesses and evidence which
tend to prove his innocence are as difficult to obtain before
formal "institution of prosecution" as afterwards, and arguably
more difficult to obtain because the (presumptively innocent)
defendant does not know what crime (s) he is alleged to have
committed.
In dealing with the constitutional issue, the supreme court
in Gladden found "the state's prosecution to this cause was
attended by delays, in large part, attributable either to Gladden's
request for continuance or the fact that he was in Federal cus-
tody and unavailable when the state was able to try him." 61
Since a partial cause of the delay was the federal marshal's
shortage of deputies, and a resulting inability to deliver the
defendant to state authorities for trial, it is submitted that the
issue of time limitations under the Code could have been re-
solved by the application of article 580 (2), which provides for
an interruption when the defendant cannot be tried "because his
presence cannot be obtained by legal process, or for any other
cause beyond the control of the state." Thus the conviction
could have properly been affirmed without disallowing the
defendant credit for time actually spent in jail prior to indict-
ment, a holding which ignores the considerations underlying the
right to a speedy trial. By analogy, it is noteworthy that a
sentencing judge is now required to credit convicted defendants
with all time actually spent in confinement; 2 surely a defendant
should also get credit for this time for purposes of computing
time limitations.
61. Id. at 747, 257 So.2d at 392.
62. LA. CODE CRIm. P. art. 880 was amended in 1970 to require the court
to give a defendant credit toward service of his sentence for time spent in
actual custody prior to the imposition of sentence. The former law allowed




Due to the "slippery"' " nature of the right to a speedy trial
and the ad hoc balancing test used to determine whether the
right has been denied, it is doubtful that a statutory scheme
could master its nuances. The ABA Standards offer guidelines
in protecting both the defendant's and society's interests, but
even a strict adherence to the standards would not likely solve
all potential problems in this area. Although the Louisiana
supreme court has recognized that the constitutional right can-
not be infringed by legislative enactments, such enactments "do
serve to establish legislative recognition of the time that body
has in all probability found to be reasonable delays for prosecu-
tions. '64 It is therefore unlikely that Louisiana courts will find
a denial of the constitutional right where the time limitations
have not expired. Gladden and Montgomery emphasize the word-
ing of code provisions at the expense of the right which the
time limitations attempt to protect. Although no statutory for-
mula, however precise, could fully and fairly implement the
right to a speedy trial in all cases, the writer submits that judicial
reflection on the underlying considerations could serve to mini-
mize anomalous results in the application of procedural rules.
Mark Gilbert Murov
PROBATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
LOUISIANA LAW AND THE ABA STANDARDS
Probation, the most frequently employed form of correc-
tional treatment,' was first used as an ameliorative device to
soften the edges of a rigid, punitive system.2 While the punish-
ment of crime was once considered to serve a prophylactic
purpose3 in itself, the focus today centers on the treatment and
rehabilitation of offenders and the correction and prevention
of factors which bring about criminal behavior.4 Probation
63. Barker v. Wingo, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2188 (1972).
64. State v. Gladden, 260 La. 735, 744, 257 So.2d 388, 391 (1972).
1. Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View
from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEx. L. REV. 1, 26 (1968).
2. Id.
3. Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CGRM. L.C.
& P.S. 176 (1952).
4. Bassett, Discretionary Power and Procedural Right in the Granting
and Revoking of Probation, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 479 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Bassett].
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